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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
LANDON v. ZORN: INQUIRY ABOUT POTENTIAL BIAS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS IN MALPRACTICE CASES IS NOT 
SUFFICIENTL Y CONNECTED WITH THE ISSUE OF TORT 
REFORM TO GENERATE A REQUIRED VOIR DIRE 
QUESTION 
By: Melyssa Morey 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a question regarding 
potential bias against plaintiffs in malpractice cases is too general in 
nature to constitute a required voir dire question. Landon v. Zorn, 389 
Md. 206, 223, 884 A.2d 142, 152 (2005). In Maryland, the scope of 
voir dire is limited and must be designed to elicit responses about the 
biases of the jurors. 
On the morning of January 8, 2001, Richard Landon ("Landon") 
went to the emergency room at Atlantic General Hospital complaining 
of leg pain and flu-like symptoms. Dr. Pamela Zorn ("Dr. Zorn") 
evaluated Landon, and initially diagnosed him as suffering from a flu-
like syndrome, and indicated that a flare up from an old leg injury was 
causing the leg pain. However, Dr. Zorn was not completely satisfied 
with the diagnosis, and asked Landon to undergo a CAT scan. He 
refused, stating he wanted to go home and sleep, and was discharged 
at 12: 15 p.m. with a prescription for a muscle relaxant and instructions 
to return to the hospital if his condition worsened. 
At 4:45 p.m. the next afternoon, Landon's wife called Dr. Zorn 
with a question, at which time Dr. Zorn reiterated that she would like 
to perform a CAT scan. Mrs. Landon said she would try to persuade 
her husband to have one. Approximately seven hours later, Dr. Zorn 
learned that Landon had not returned for the test and called Mrs. 
Landon, instructing her to bring her husband back to the hospital even 
if she had to call 911. Landon returned to the hospital just before 
midnight, and was transferred to Maryland's Shock Trauma Center. 
He was diagnosed with a group A beta hemolytic streptococcal 
infection and underwent multiple surgeries, including the amputation 
of his leg at the hip. 
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The Landons sued Dr. Zorn in the Circuit Court for Worcester 
County, claiming medical negligence. A jury found in favor of Dr. 
Zorn, determining that she did not breach the standard of care in her 
treatment of Landon. The Landons appealed and the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari prior to the Court of Special Appeals' 
consideration of the matter. 
The Landons presented two questions on appeal: "[ d]id the circuit 
court err by failing to voir dire the prospective jurors on the issue of 
tort reform?" and "[ d]id the circuit court err by failing to give a 
requested jury instruction and the Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction on 
informed consent?" Id. at 211,884 A.2d at 144-45. 
The Court initially stated that the first question presented by the 
Landons on appeal was not reflective of their proposed voir dire 
question, which was not connected to the issue of tort reform. Id. at 
217, 8&4 A.2d at 148. The voir dire question that the Landons wanted 
asked read: 
Does any member of the jury panel have any 
preconceived opinion or bias or prejudice in favor of, or 
against plaintiffs in personal injury cases in general and 
medical malpractice cases in particular? If yes, please 
explain. Would this prevent you from fairly and 
impartially trying the facts and circumstances presented 
in this matter? 
Id. at 214, 884 A.2d at 146. The Court noted that voir dire is limited 
in scope in Maryland, and courts have the discretion to ask or not ask 
proposed voir dire questions. Id. at 216, 884 A.2d at 148. Unless a 
voir dire question is properly formed to determine a potential cause for 
disqualification, it can be excluded absent any prejudice to the 
plaintiffs. Id. at 218, 884 A.2d at 149 (citing Kujawa v. Baltimore 
Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96 (1961)). The Landons argued 
that their question was "designed to uncover potential prejudice 
against them and in favor of doctors in medical malpractice cases." Id. 
at 217,884 A.2d at 148. 
The Court went on to state that just because a person holds a 
particular belief does not mean it will affect his ability to consider 
evidence fairly and impartially in reaching a conclusion. Id. at 215, 
884 A.2d at 146 fn.3. If jurors were excluded for their beliefs, the 
public policy of having a jury that represents a cross section of the 
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community would be nullified. Id. Jurors cannot be automatically 
excluded from the jury pool simply based on their beliefs about a law 
or policy, so long as they feel they can reach a fair and impartial 
conclusion based on the law. Id. at 219,884 A.2d at 149. 
The Landons also asked the Court to apply the principles of 
Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P .2d 688 (Mont. 1979) to "voir dire questions 
involving medical malpractice and tort reform." Landon, 389 Md. at 
220, 884 A.2d at 150. Borkoski sued a hospital and two doctors 
following the death of his wife. Id. The insurance company that 
provided malpractice insurance to the doctors had been involved in an 
advertising campaign that targeted jurors and claimed that "[l]arge 
jury awards would result in everyone paying higher insurance 
premiums." Id. (quoting Borkoski, 594 P.2d at 689-90). Borkoski 
proposed a voir dire question, which the trial court declined to ask, 
inquiring whether potential jurors had been exposed to these 
advertisements. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana 
affirmed the trial court's ruling, but noted that "upon a proper showing 
of possible prejudice" it may be appropriate to give a voir dire 
question that asked whether jurors had heard or read anything 
indicating that plaintiff s verdicts in personal injury cases resulted in 
higher insurance premiums for everyone, if they believed it, and if 
they thought it would interfere with their ability to render a fair 
verdict. Id. at 220-221, 884 A.2d at 150. (quoting Borkoski, 594 P.2d 
at 694). The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to adopt the 
principles of Borkoski stating that, unlike in Montana, voir dire in 
Maryland is limited in scope and that the Landons' case did not 
warrant expansion of the scope. Id. at 222-23,884 A.2d at 151-52. 
Regarding jury instructions, the Landons challenged the trial 
court's refusal to give two instructions, one regarding contributory 
negligence and the other informed consent. Id. at 224, 884 A.2d at 
152. According to Maryland Rule 2-520(c), the court does not need to 
give a requested jury instruction if the matter is covered by other 
instructions actually given. Id. at 224, 884 A.2d at 153. Instead of 
giving the Landons' requested jury instruction, the trial court gave an 
instruction based on the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions on 
contributory negligence. Id. at 225,884 A.2d at 153. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision because the 
Landons could not show that they had been prejudiced by the failure to 
give their requested jury instruction. Id. at 227, 884 A.2d at 154. The 
jury did not reach the question of contributory negligence, as the 
verdict sheet instructed them not to answer any further questions if 
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they answered "No" to the first question concerning the breach of 
standard of care. Id. at 228,884 A.2d at 154, 155. 
As to the trial court's failure to give an instruction on infonned 
consent, the Court ruled that in Maryland a cause of action for lack of 
consent can only be based on failure to get consent before perfonning 
an affinnative act on a patient. Id. at 229, 884 A.2d at 155. Dr. Zorn 
did not undertake an affinnative act, but merely recommended a 
diagnostic test. Id. at 230, 884 A.2d at 156. Even if this could be 
considered an affinnative act, the Landons did not establish that the 
standard of care required Dr. Zorn to infonn Landon of the risks of not 
having the test, thus they were not entitled to the infonned consent 
instruction. Id. 
While the Court stated the Landons' proposed voir dire question 
was too general and had no clear connection to the issue of tort refonn, 
it did not address how specific a question must be for there to be a 
connection. The Court also did not delve into what facts in a case may 
warrant an expansion of the scope of voir dire in Maryland, along the 
lines of Borkoski. Finally, the Court's repeated admonition that a 
person may be able to fairly render a verdict despite a particular bias 
they have about tort refonn seems to ignore basic human nature. A 
person who believes that medical malpractice lawsuits are driving up 
the cost of insurance and healthcare across America is not very likely 
to find for the plaintiff just because the current law allows them to do 
so. 
